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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I will address Deleuze and Guattari’s consideration of capitalism’s aborted birth in China by 
approaching the problematic from within their philosophy of history. To begin with, I will set out Deleuze and 
Guattari’s immediate answer, canvassing their machinic ontology and the significance that they place on immanence 
to the emergence of capitalism. In doing so, the question of history and historical interpretation will be raised. 
Following, I will investigate the status of such questions and inquire as to why Deleuze and Guattari continually 
pose them. From this analysis I will suggest that a critical philosophy of non-events can be found in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work that is related to but distinct from their philosophy of the Event. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Why wasn’t capitalism born in China? Why did capitalism emerge in the West, rather than China of the third or even 
eighth century? Deleuze and Guattari consider this question on numerous occasions throughout their writings. The 
answer that they provide is, in a word, the State. Through its principle of capture and control, the State apparatus 
restricts the intensification, propagation and abstract conjugation of decoded flows, thus inhibiting the facilitation of 
a field of immanence upon which capitalism depends. This response, apart from some terminological intricacies, is 
rather straightforward. However, what is it that lies behind this relatively simple response? And more importantly, 
what is it that motivates the question and Deleuze and Guattari’s frequent return to it? If one glances at the various 
instances that the question of capitalism’s emergence is invoked, it will become clear that Deleuze and Guattari are 
not always so interested in the answer. Instead, the question is often raised in order to illustrate the significance of a 
particular kind of question – namely, the kind of question that calls into consideration the contingency of history and 
the history of contingency. After discussing Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to the question of capitalism’s non-
emergence in China, the second part of this paper will thus explore the manner in which this question – or more 
specifically, questions of this kind – might suggest to us a philosophy non-event that, although related to Deleuze’s 
notorious notion of the Event, is arguably irreducible to it. 
 
 
The Answer: The State 
 
Before I elaborate Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to the question of capitalism’s aborted birth in China, I must 
provide a disclaimer:  I am not an expert on the history of China or the history of capitalism, let alone the history of 
capitalism in China. But nor, it must be added, were Deleuze and Guattari. Partly for this reason, my intention here, 
as with Deleuze and Guattari, will not be to answer this question historically, but philosophically. This is not to say 
that an historical question can be answered or reduced to philosophy, but simply that the question ‘why wasn’t 
capitalism born in China’ is for Deleuze and Guattari a philosophical question. It would thus be somewhat unfair, or 
at least inappropriate, to contest their response to this question purely on historical grounds.1 There are of course 
important interlays between history and philosophy, and indeed the majority of my own work attempts to tease out 
these relations.2 But I just want to stress from the outset that my treatment of this question will focus not so much on 
the history at play here, but the philosophy of history. So for those who are experts in this area of history, or were 
hoping to hear from such an expert, I must sincerely apologize. 
 
So, why wasn’t capitalism born in China? As I have already indicated, Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to this is 
because the State put a stop to it. To briefly explain, the capitalist machine, for Deleuze and Guattari, is effectively 
defined by its preeminence in two respects: on the one hand decoding/deterritorialization, and on the other 
axiomatization. Concerning the former of these processes, unlike the primitive territorial machine which codes the 
earth and the barbarian despotic machine which overcodes these various codes, directing them towards a despot, the 
capitalist machine decodes all codes and overcodes, rendering them all exchangeable within a worldwide market. 
 The capitalist, as such, is not beholden to any particular code:  instead, what the capitalist is interested in is the 
conversion of all codes and overcodes into flux.3 For example, it makes no difference to a capitalist ‘what’ is 
inscribed in each code, for all that matters is the translation of those codes into capital flow so that differences 
between them can be capitalized upon. In today’s world it is perhaps the futures-trader that best illustrates this 
activity. As codes travel across a computer screen, the trader is not so much concerned with its actual value as he/she 
is with its differential value. Given this ethic and ontology, the process of capitalization does not even make any 
intrinsic claims on efficiency: it matters not to capitalism whether the capital produced is done so by the most 
advanced means or the most antiquated; a place will be found for all, provided it contributes to the increased 
production of capital flow. If capitalism is thought of as a modern phenomenon, it is therefore only insofar as it is 
anachronistic; capitalism does not kill off the past, but puts it to work. 
 
This characterization of capitalism, whereby capitalism is equated with the ongoing and amorphous decoding of 
flows, aptly describes what Marx might have meant by his dictum: ‘all that is solid melts into air’. As the social 
machine that trades in codes and proliferates vectors of deterritorialization, capitalism can be said to exert what 
Deleuze and Guattari call elsewhere the nomadic force of a war machine. Indeed, the capitalist and the nomad have 
much in common. Both, for instance, resist the regulations of the State apparatus: the nomad constructs a war 
machine directed towards breaking State striation, while the capitalist often measures their worth by how effectively 
loopholes can be found, created and exploited.4 In light of this, it is not surprising that the State by and large fears 
the deterritorializing power of capitalism, and attempts to control it as far as possible, while harnessing its awesome 
power.5 To paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is the dread that the State feels of a flow that would elude its 
overcoding.6 It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari write the following in Anti-Oedipus: 
 
The despotic machine holds the following in common with the primitive machine, it confirms the latter in the 
following respect: the dread of decoded flows – the flows of production, but also mercantile flows of 
exchange and commerce that might escape the State monopoly, with its tight restrictions and its plugging of 
flows. When Etienne Balazs asks why capitalism wasn’t born in China in the thirteenth century, when all the 
necessary scientific and technical conditions nevertheless seemed to be present, the answer lies in the State, 
which closed the mines as soon as the reserves of metal were judged sufficient, and which retained a 
monopoly or a narrow control over commerce (the merchant as functionary).7 
 
Deleuze and Guattari extend this analysis in A Thousand Plateaus. As they again note, the conditions for the birth of 
capitalism most certainly existed in China long before its eventual emergence in the West. However, if capitalism 
wasn’t born in China, it is because the State does not allow for what Deleuze and Guattari call “a general axiomatic 
of decoded flows” to form.8 This addendum is most significant for our purposes: if capitalism doesn’t appear first in 
China, it is not simply because the State interrupts the free flow of deterritorialization. More specifically, the State 
prevents an axiomatic structure from forming that is capable of facilitating not merely “topical conjunctions that 
stand as so many knots and recordings, [but] a whole generalized conjunction that overspills and overturns the 
preceding apparatuses.”9 In short, it is not capture per se that is the problem: what capitalism requires is a particular 
kind of conjunction – an axiomatic that can give rise to “A new threshold of deterritorialization.”10 
 
By axiomatic, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly mean that as defined and used by modern mathematics. As they 
describe it: “the axiomatic deals directly with purely functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, 
and which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultaneously.”11 Thus axioms do not offer their own 
exegeses, but rather provide the formal system and operational field in which differential relations and 
capitalizations occur. Because of this, the axiomatic axis of capitalism is uniquely positioned to interface with the 
processes of decoding and becoming that define its other side. As the pure immanence of flow continues to evade 
codes and overcodings unabated, the capitalist machine can appropriate any and all of these escaping lines of flight 
by simply adding on a new axiom or subtracting an old one. This gives capitalism an unrivalled flexibility and 
multiple realizability. Changes in the social field lead to the addition of new axioms, which in turn generate a new 
structure from which further decodings escape, only to then be reabsorbed by the addition of new axioms that 
‘capitalize’ upon the newly generated difference: “How much flexibility there is in the axiomatic of capitalism, 
always ready to widen its own limits so as to add a new axiom to a previously saturated system.”12 In this manner, 
capitalism continually displaces its own limits in the very same moment (or movement) that it realizes them. And 
this is indeed the “deepest law of capitalism: it continually sets and then repels its own limits, but in so doing gives 
rise to numerous flows in all directions that escape its axiomatic.”13 
 
When Deleuze and Guattari again return to the question of capitalism’s aborted birth in China, this time in What Is 
 Philosophy?, it is precisely this ‘law’ of capitalism that they will have in mind. By way of this ‘law’, capitalism 
instantiates a plane of immanence that extends itself across the globe. As they now put it: 
 
Marx accurately constructs a concept of capitalism by determining the two principal components, naked labor 
and pure wealth, with their zone of indiscernibility when wealth buys labor. Why capitalism in the West 
rather than in China in the third or even eighth century? Because the West slowly brings together and adjusts 
these components, whereas the East prevents them from reaching fruition. Only the West extends and 
propagates its centers of immanence. The social field no longer refers to an external limit that restricts it from 
above, as in the empires, but to immanent internal limits that constantly shift by extending the system, and 
that reconstitute themselves through displacement. External obstacles are now only technological, and only 
internal rivalries remain. A world market extends to the ends of the earth before passing into the galaxy: even 
the skies become horizontal.14 
 
There is much that we could say about this passage, but what I would like to draw our attention to here is the context 
in which it is deployed. In this section of What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari are specifically concerned with 
explaining not the birth of capitalism, but in fact the birth and rebirth of Philosophy. As it happens, capitalism, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, will play a vital role in the re-emergence of Philosophy in modern Europe. This 
is because Philosophy, like capitalism, will also require a generalized conjunction of principle elements, in this case 
friendship, opinion and a field of immanence, the latter of which is afforded in the modern period by capitalism. But 
here is my point:  as this passage demonstrates, the question of the birth of capitalism is analogous, or more 
accurately isomorphic, with the question of the birth of Philosophy.15 
 
A few pages before the one I just quoted from, Deleuze and Guattari pose the following question when investigating 
the birth of philosophy in Ancient Greece: “Can we speak of Chinese, Hindu, Jewish, or Islamic ‘philosophy’?.”16 
Their response to this question is no, to the extent that a conjunction or encounter between relative and absolute 
deterritorialization does not occur in these other places (or at least does not occur prior to the birth of philosophy in 
Ancient Greece). The birth of philosophy thus depends upon a conjunction or encounter that is both synthetic and 
contingent: “Even in the concept”, as Deleuze and Guattari say, “the principle depends upon a connection of 
components that could have been different.”17 One way of looking at this comparison of capitalism and Philosophy 
would be to say that we have the same answer to two different questions. The question this time is about the 
emergence of Philosophy, not capitalism, but the answer again turns on the prevention or facilitation of a particular, 
generalized and contingent conjunction of principle elements or flows. It is not hard to find other examples of this 
kind in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. When discussing the relation between Western naval dominance and the advent 
of capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari ask, citing Fernand Braudel, “why not Chinese, Japanese, or even Moslem 
ships? Why not Sinbad the Sailor?.”18 The answer is again the same: it is not technique that is lacking. Rather, the 
required conjunction remains “caught in the nets of the despotic State, entirely invested in the despot’s machine.”19 
However, as my above reference to isomorphism suggests, another way of framing what is happening here would be 
to say that what we have in these different instances is the same question, or more exactly, the same kind or form of 
question, that is being deployed in different contexts – the birth of capitalism, Philosophy and naval supremacy – 
each time for the same purpose. What then is this kind of question, and for what purpose is it being deployed? 
 
 
The Question: History, Contingency and Non-Events 
 
It would seem to me that if this kind of question is of significance to Deleuze and Guattari, it is primarily due to its 
capacity to help us better appreciate the nature of contingent encounters, and in turn to aid both our understanding 
and alteration of reality. Perhaps surprisingly, for those familiar with Deleuze’s critical remarks about the discipline 
and ontology of history, it is historians who Deleuze and Guattari suggest are most sensitive to the fragility and 
specificity of contingent encounters. As they put it in Anti-Oedipus: “Let us return to this eminently contingent 
question that modern historians know how to ask: why Europe, why not China?.”20 In a way, it is this kind of 
question that is the quintessential historical question: why did encounter x occur where it did, when it did? At play in 
this question, I would put forward, is nothing less than the wonder of history, or the wonder that the historian 
experiences when peering into the depths of the past; it is the quite basic insight that all sorts of accidents and 
contingent events were required for a particular encounter to occur.21 Many historians no doubt devote their energies 
to minimizing or eradicating the spectre of this contingency, often by falling back on or allowing for teleological or 
causal-linear mechanisms to guide their work – what Henri Bergson would refer to as ‘radical finalism’ and ‘radical 
mechanism’. But as Deleuze and Guattari recognize, history and contingency share a bond. 
  
What the question in the title of my paper drives at, what it calls into consideration, is therefore the contingency of 
history, and the history of contingency, which is to say, the problem or problematic of historical contingency. If one 
aspect of this problematic involves the realization that what happened in history need not have, then the 
supplemental realization to this would be that what did not happen could have. This is effectively what the question 
about the non-birth of capitalism is all about: it is a question about what did not happen. Historical contingency, I 
would thus claim, is not simply about ‘what happened’; it cannot be wholly contained by or reduced to an 
investigation into the past nature of an event. On the contrary, the problematic of historical contingency involves an 
active exploration into what did not happen, or, the nature of non-events.  
 
To take seriously the non-event in this way, and to distinguish it philosophically from the Deleuzian event, is 
perhaps a little far-fetched; perhaps it would be more accurate and straightforward to describe such non-events as the 
non-actualization of a virtual event. But perhaps not. Before deciding, let us consider the most relevant Deleuzian 
text on the matter: chapter 8 of A Thousand Plateaus, “1874: Three Novellas, or, What Happened?.” As Deleuze and 
Guattari explain in the opening pages of this plateau, in contrast to the literary genre of the ‘tale’ which entrances 
and pulls the reader along by continually gesturing to ‘what is going to happen’, the ‘novella’ is organized around 
the converse question ‘what happened’: “In the novella, we do not wait for something to happen, we expect 
something to have just happened.”22 Deleuze and Guattari are careful to insist that it would be an error to reduce 
these different aspects to dimensions of time. While it is true that one of these movements “casts [the present] into 
the past from the moment it is present (novella), while another simultaneously draws it into the future (tale)”,23 this is 
to a certain extent beside the point. What is key about the question of ‘what happened’ is not so much its relation to 
the past, but more specifically the manner in which “it places us in a relation with something unknowable and 
imperceptible.”24 Or as Deleuze and Guattari further clarify: “it is not a question of saying that the novella relates to 
the past and the tale to the future; what we should say instead is that the novella relates, in the present itself, to the 
formal dimension of something that has happened, even if that something is nothing or remains unknowable.”25 
 
But if the novella is above all concerned with something that has happened, even in those cases where that 
something is nothing or remains unknowable, is this to say that the novella is equally concerned with what did not 
happen? There is good reason to think otherwise. This can be demonstrated by considering Deleuze and Guattari’s 
alternative formulation of the question ‘what happened’: ‘Whatever could have happened?’. While it could be 
suggested that this alternative formulation alludes to that which could have happened but didn’t, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s further expansions of this question dispel this possibility. As they say, this particular question is best put 
by F. Scott Fitzgerald: “Whatever could have happened for things to have come to this?.”26 If this question is distinct 
from the question of ‘what did not happen, but could have’, it is most likely due to the differing relations they form 
between the present and the past – or equally, between what is, the known/perceptible and the 
unknown/imperceptible. While Fitzgerald’s question forms a relation between something in the past (even if that 
something is nothing or unknowable) to what is (or, the present condition), the question of ‘what did not occur, but 
could have’ concerns the relation between something absent in history and what is (because it did occur, or 
continues to). 
 
Now, it must be admitted that there are clearly close affinities between the questions of what did not happen and 
what did. In a murder mystery, for example, the model detective is always simultaneously concerned with 
determining both what happened and what did not – the separation of fact from fiction, as it were. It is also often the 
case that our detective hero (or historian), like in a game of Cluedo, arrives at the truth of what happened by 
incrementally eliminating (progressively determining) possible alternatives of what could have happened but didn’t, 
and what did not happen because it couldn’t have (‘it couldn’t have been the butler, as he is left-handed!’). 
Nevertheless, I would claim that these two questions remain distinct, both with respect to the manner in which they 
are pursued and the manner in which they relate to a present reality. 
 
This can be demonstrated if we focus on the second half of the question ‘what did not happen, but could have’. In 
fact, let us momentarily focus on the particular word in this phrase that invokes the realm of possibility (by which I 
mean, in Deleuze’s terminology, virtuality): could. Let us furthermore extend our literary purview beyond that of the 
novella and tale. Of all literary genres, it is perhaps science fiction that is most interested in exploring this realm of 
the ‘could’, or more specifically, the question of ‘what could happen’.27 However, if science fiction is concerned 
with this question, it is arguably only insofar as it is able to shed light on our present condition. Science fiction, and 
in particular its dystopian variants, engages in not mere fantasy making, but more profoundly contemporary 
 diagnosis. As such, it creates a non-existent reality, so as to tell us something about our own reality, and to in turn 
facilitate the creation of a new reality.28 
 
When put this way, science fiction could be said to be untimely. As Deleuze learns from Nietzsche, the untimely is 
that which acts “counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to 
come.”29 But if we return to the essay this lesson is originally taken from, Nietzsche’s “On the Utility and Liability 
of History for Life”, we will see that history also produces this untimely affect. Indeed, as the full quote reads: 
 
But I have to concede this much to myself as someone who by occupation is a classical philologist, for I have 
no idea what the significance of classical philology would be in our age, if not to have an unfashionable 
effect – that is, to work against the time and thereby have an effect upon it, hopefully for the benefit of a 
future time.30 
 
It is thus not surprising that science fiction’s concern for what could happen naturally correlates with the historical 
question of what could have happened: both questions are, in short, untimely. It is true that the approach route to the 
present is different in each case, one from the future and the other from the past, but this aspect is secondary to the 
untimely impetus that drives them both forward – the ‘could’ at their core, or in other words, the question of 
contingency. 
 
What we have here are thus two different sets of relations, or complexes. On the one hand, following Deleuze and 
Guattari’s plateau on the Three Novellas, we have the novella, or the question of ‘what happened’, the tale, or the 
question of ‘what is going to happen’, and the manner in which these explain ‘this situation’, or what is. And on the 
other hand, following my alternative formulation, we have historical counterfactuals, or the question of ‘what did 
not happen/could have happened but did not’, science fiction, or the question of ‘what could happen’, and the 
manner in which these explorations into what is not the case or could be shed light on what is (and potentially alter 
it). Both complexes, one could note, are concerned with being able to tell us something about our current reality, and 
by extension, to proliferate new possibilities. Both, furthermore, are ultimately concerned with contingency. But 
there are differences. To refer back to that ‘eminently contingent question that modern historians know how to ask’, 
when Fitzgerald asks himself ‘how is it that things have come to this’, in a certain respect he asks the equivalent of 
‘why Europe?’. However, what Fitzgerald’s question does not ask is ‘why not China?’. In other words, if Fitzgerald 
is a “novella writer of genius”, it is not because he inquires into other worlds that might have been, but rather 
because of his profound ability to articulate and explore his own broken reality, an eventuality that has come to be, 
even if he is not sure why or how he got there.31 What we have here, I would claim, are thus two distinct complexes, 
both in their temporal relations (the way they relate past, present and the future) and their relations of contingency, 
the known/perceptible and the unknown/imperceptible. 
 
Ultimately, we can therefore conclude that Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in the question of ‘what happened’ is 
distinct in several important respects from this paper’s interest is the nature of non-events and the question of ‘what 
did not happen’. While the novella and the tale reflect the manner “in which the living present is divided at every 
instant”,32 and in so doing replicate Deleuze’s description of the aionic Event as that which is always already 
happened and yet to happen,33 historical counterfactuals and science fiction concern an altogether different set of 
questions regarding the nature of ‘what did not happen’, ‘what could happen’ and their relations to the production of 
reality.34 In light of this, it would be inappropriate, or at the very least inadequate, to understand non-events as 
merely a non-actualization of a virtual event. For not only do non-events involve a different complex of relations 
than that of the event, but they are also no less untimely in nature. 
 
This claim could perhaps be best summed up by the acknowledgement that non-events are not events. It is, however, 
this entirely banal fact that is most perplexing for the study of non-events. For when we speak of or think about the 
non-birth of capitalism in China, do we not eventalize a non-event? Do we not inquire into that which happened in 
what did not? Or put differently again, are not non-events merely the reflections or shadows of events? To a certain 
extent, this is a question about possibility. In his essay “The Possible and the Real”, Bergson argues that something 
which is possible can only have been possible. Possibilities thus do not pre-exist their realization, for they are 
retrospectively placed into the past by the present: “The possible is therefore the mirage of the present in the past; 
and as we know the future will finally constitute a present and the mirage effect is continually being produced, we 
are convinced that the image of tomorrow is already contained in our actual present, which will be the past of 
tomorrow, although we did not manage to grasp it.”35 While it might be tempting to think of non-events in this 
 manner – as possibilities retrospectively placed into the past by that which happens – this explanation is arguably a 
poor fit. This is because, as we have seen, science fiction does not deal in ‘images of tomorrow’ of this kind, insofar 
as it is untimely. Similarly, insofar as historical counterfactuals are untimely, they are again inadequately explained 
by this Bergsonian description of retrospectivity. As Bergsonian possibilities are retrospectively posited into the past 
by the present, they are in effect powerless or lifeless – a vampiric image that is a shadow of vital life. By contrast, 
non-events, as untimely, are productive and exude their own power (puissance). 
 
It is therefore also a question about power and productivity. Non-events, I would claim, cannot be solely understood 
in terms of lack or the ‘thing missing’, nor can they be defined by negation or the negative. This is because, as 
Deleuze would say of both desire and non-being, non-events are themselves productive and positive, which is to say 
that there is something truly provocative about the question, ‘why wasn’t capitalism born in China?’ As a result, 
non-events are not merely the by-product of events, nor are they merely representations of lack. Rather, non-events 
involve the construction of real territories, and their deterritorialization. They involve the creation of other worlds – 
worlds that are not fake or possible, but real, insofar as they tell us something important about reality, its history and 
its becoming.36 Non-events achieve this, furthermore, in a manner distinct from events, to the extent that the 
question of ‘what did not happen’ and its pursuit is different in kind from the question and pursuit of what did. 
 
So let us consider the question one last time, but this time without any care for the answer: why wasn’t capitalism 
born in China? If this question (and others like it) demands our attention, it is because it poses a problem. Why 
didn’t something happen, when it could have? One possible response to such a question would be to reduce what 
didn’t happen to what did, to explain contingency via necessity. However, if the contingency of an encounter is to be 
truly appreciated, then the absence or difference intrinsic to the question of what did not happen must not be fully 
equalized or covered over by the presence or identity of what did. For non-events, as I have shown, are both 
irreducible to events and distinct from the non-actualizations of events. They are, furthermore, productive in-
themselves, insofar as they are capable of addressing real problems and constructing new ones: 
 
Those who continue to have recourse to History and protest against the indetermination of a concept such as 
‘mutation’ should bear in mind the perplexity of real historians when they have to explain why capitalism 
arose at such a time and in such a place when so many factors could have made it equally possible at another 
time and place. ‘To problematize series. . .’ Whether discursive or not, formations, families and multiplicities 
are historical. They are not just compounds built up from their coexistence but are inseparable from ‘temporal 
reactors of derivation’; and when a new formation appears, with new rules and series, it never comes all at 
once, in a single phrase or act of creation, but emerges like a series of ‘building blocks’, with gaps, traces and 
reactivations of former elements that survive under the new rules. […] One must pursue the different series, 
travel along the different levels, and cross all thresholds; instead of simply displaying phenomena or 
statements in their vertical or horizontal dimensions, one must form a transversal or mobile diagonal line 
along which the archaeologist-archivist must move.37 
 
In concluding, the question about why wasn’t capitalism born in China tells us much: it tells us about what is 
capitalism, what is the State apparatus of capture, and what is their relation to one another. But it also does much 
more than this. It emphasizes the relation between history and contingency; it demands that we take seriously not 
only what happened, but what did not, and the manner in which the two are distinct and intertwined. Finally, the 
question of capitalism’s non-birth in China draws our attention to not only the contingency of history, but the 
historical nature of contingency and creativity. It reminds us that multiplicities are in part historical, and that if we 
are to draw the diagonal or problematize reality, then such historical sensibilities will be indispensable. 
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